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Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard

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Calcagno, Riccardo | WAGNER, Wolf

We generalize a standard general equilibrium framework extended for moral hazard to allowfor a dispersed initial ownership distribution of firms.We show that the market allocation is constrained-efficient only when in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through unobservable effort has full initial ownership in his firm.

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