Article


On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game


in Economics Bulletin , 32 (4)

ISSN : 1545-2921

par Ruble, Richard ; Versaevel, Bruno

2012 - 2817-2827 P. | En anglais

Voir la revue «Economics Bulletin»

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