Article


Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability


in International Journal of Economic Theory , 9 (3)

ISSN : 1742-7355

par Billette de Villemeur, Etienne ; Flochel, Laurent ; Versaevel, Bruno

2013 - 203-227 P. | En anglais

Voir la revue «International Journal of Economic Theory»

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